Friday, June 22, 2007

Physical Security - the unlikely does happen

Police in Tulsa are chasing a ring of criminals who are conducting large scale thefts that most security folks would rate low on the probability scale.

Their most recent heist involved rappelling from the ceiling of a Best Buy to steal a large safe and electronics. They even disabled the alarm system. In other thefts, they've stolen a semi-trailer sized load of electronics, and cut through the side of a building.

I've seen drywall walls cut through to get into an otherwise well secured room, and I've seen datacenters that had no security camera, easy dock access, and a back door latch easily tripped with a credit card or screwdriver. While we're not used to physical theft, it is a fact of life, and if you have valuable, portable items - or even not so portable items, there is a risk.

If you have valuable merchandise, or if your data center has business critical data, you might want to talk to your management about the unlikely, but possible...

Thursday, June 21, 2007

What if everybody used your SSN?

The story starts like this:

"In 1938, wallet manufacturer the E. H. Ferree company in Lockport, New York decided to promote its product by showing how a Social Security card would fit into its wallets. A sample card, used for display purposes, was inserted in each wallet. Company Vice President and Treasurer Douglas Patterson thought it would be a clever idea to use the actual SSN of his secretary, Mrs. Hilda Schrader Whitcher."
Read the rest on the Social Security Administration's website. If you deal with user IDs, or Social Security numbers, this one will make you wince...and smile.

Wednesday, June 20, 2007

Wipe your devices

Like many IT folks, I've picked up used systems and media that contained data.

In my case, I've had everything from departmental mail servers to personal systems containing term papers and billing information pass through my hands. In each case, I carefully wiped the machine or drive before doing anything else with it.

What happens when it goes the other way? Dale Glass's network camera is a great example. He set up the camera to email him when it detected motion, then returned the camera to the retailer. The retailer didn't wipe it, the family that bought it didn't wipe the configuration, and Mr. Glass received email with video of the family.

Here's your reminder to wipe devices when they leave your care - and to check new ones when they come in!

Monday, June 18, 2007

Web application security test software reviews

Jordan Wiens is writing a series of "rolling reviews" on web application security testing software. First up on his plate is SPI Dynamics' WebInspect. You can find the full article here. He points out a high false positive rate, and that it had real issues with Ajax - neither of which surprise me. Any analyst who has been doing system vulnerability scans knows that false positives were (and at times still are) a fact of life - seeing those come up with web applications isn't a real surprise. In many ways, web application security testing feels like vulnerability scanning did a few years ago.

I'll be interested to see what direction the rest of the reviews take - most of the big names in web penetration and security testing still do a lot of manual work to inspect applications. In a business environment, particularly in a budget, skill, and time constrained environment, that may not work well.

Those limitations make the availability - and the accuracy and depth of tools like WebInspect - absolutely critical to custom application development processes. More and more organizations are adding security scans and testing into their development cycle.

One of my current goals is to find a way to easily put a good testing tool into the hands of developers that I work with. I'd like to see them able to take a good first pass at their own applications before running it past security for review - system administrators already have the ability to run vulnerability scans against their new servers and workstations, and that model has been helpful and is worth repeating.

Is that a complete solution to web application security? Definitely not. Will it put us in a better place than we were before we added testing to the development lifecycle? Definitely.

Wednesday, May 30, 2007

Public access


Security picture of the day from a friend - or is that insecurity? Click it to magnify - yes, those are a user ID and password pair on the monitor. If you've got a great shot of a bad security practice, send it in!

Thursday, May 24, 2007

Free lunch: Trust models that don't work

Both business and pleasure travelers are used to seeing bills at hotel restaurants that let you simply write down your room number and your name to charge the bill to your room. Most of us are used to seeing it, and we probably even wonder how often it is exploited.

In my case, it was exploited on a recent stay at an upscale hotel on the west coast during a conference.

My normal departure morning routine is to check the paper bill most hotels now slide under your door the morning of checkout. In my still sleepy daze, I glanced at the bill, expecting it to show a zero balance...

It carried a total of over $300 from the hotel restaurant, and a charge to my credit card for that amount.

This obviously wasn't right - I hadn't eaten in the hotel restaurant, and in fact, all the meals I had eaten had been provided as part of the conference, or by friends off site. Something odd was going on. As with most people, I first thought that there was likely a billing mistake, although the security analyst side of my brain started to ponder how a $300 charge had popped up.

A trip down to the desk and a chat with the clerk changed my initial reaction. They did, in fact have a receipt with my name, a signature, and my room number all filled out - in handwriting that wasn't mine, at a time I was in the conference, and with food for at least four people.

I would have remembered the crab and lobster, let alone the rest of the $300 of food and drinks that were signed for on that receipt.

In the end, the hotel handled it with reasonable aplomb, but I was stunned to see that there was absolutely no verification of the identity of people signing for large bills. This places the hotel itself on the losing end of transactions. If they had left the charge, I would have simply disputed it. As it was, they now have to investigate how someone got my name and room number.

A few simple controls could have prevented this:

  • Check ID for anything charged to a room number.
  • Allow people to elect to not allow anything beyond the room to be charged to their credit cards at check-in.
  • Set a maximum charge limit, either by hotel policy, or for the person who pays for the room.
There is of course the danger of upsetting customers with new requirements like this, particularly at an upscale hotel where patrons are used to the service. Thus, some hotels would find that the optional security approach may be more acceptable to their patronage.

The other interesting thing about the incident is that in talking with hotel staff after the fact, one staff member had a very hard time believing that anybody would take advantage of this loophole. While I can understand that hotel staff members would generally not do this for fear of losing their jobs, I wasn't horribly surprised to find out that someone would try to take advantage of the loophole itself. In many cases, the bill would have been paid for using a corporate card, or possibly by a sponsor, and I wouldn't have ever noticed the discrepancy. The fact that the bill was mine meant that detection was much easier.

Next time you stay at a hotel, see how many times you are given the option of charging to your room - and how easily you can get access to the first initial, last name, and room number of anybody else you run into.

Wednesday, May 16, 2007

Open proxy honeypots

Most of us probably don't run open proxies ourselves - but if you're a higher education security analyst, you probably have at least one on campus, even if you'd prefer not to. That means that your threats may come from inside your border, and worse, that it may be open on purpose.

What do they get used for? Well, a great way to find out is to make an open proxy honeypot.

What can you do with an open proxy acting as a honeypot? Here's a great example - Ryan Barnett from the Web Application Security Consortium has a very interesting presentation available about traffic they observed through a proxy honeypot. It is well worth the read.

Most of us are headed down a road to securing the business side of our institutions, but the academic and student sides are often more problematic. We'll continue to see open proxies, both on our networks, and in use by our users. The good news is that the next time someone asks you about the dangers of open proxies, you'll have an excellent case study in hand.